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Forthcoming in Justin Desautels-Stein and Christopher Tomlins (eds.)   
Searching for Contemporary Legal Thought  





Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon 
 
 
 This essay, written for a volume surveying “contemporary legal 
thought”, provides an overview of Democratic Experimentalism, a 
perspective that draws on both pragmatist social theory and recent 
practical innovations in private and public organization.  Normatively, 
Democratic Experimentalism aligns with process theories that emphasize 
the role of courts in vindicating entitlements through inducing, 
collaborating with, and policing institutions, rather than vindicating them 
directly through interpretive or policy-engineering techniques.  It departs 
from some such theories, however, in emphasizing that practice must often 
take the form of continuous investigation and revision, rather than the 
adoption of definitive solutions already known to at least some social 
actors.  Descriptively, Democratic Experimentalism purports to give a 
better account than other perspectives of important recent developments 
in private, public, and international law that aspire to enhance 
decentralization and accountability simultaneously. 
 
 
 Democratic Experimentalism is an orientation in contemporary 
legal thought that draws on both the critical impulses of modernist theory 
and the constructive practice of post-bureaucratic organization.   
 Some of the core ideas of Democratic Experimentalism were 
formulated long ago, notably by pragmatists in the John Dewey mold, but 
they have been elaborated in response to social developments of recent 
decades.  A recurring challenge presented by these developments is 
uncertainty, by which we mean the inability to anticipate, much less to 
assign a probability to, future states of the world.  The constellation of 
changes that make contemporary economies more innovative produces 
uncertainty: As innovations cascade, breakthroughs in one domain become 
relevant in other, distant ones.  Deep knowledge of what has gone before 
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becomes a poor guide of what is to come. On occasion, innovation results 
in catastrophe when unforeseen consequences concatenate in the short 
term, as in the financial crisis of 2008, or in the long term, as with climate 
change. More often, innovation produces social destabilization, dislocating 
branches and even sectors of activity.  
 At the same time, both the perception of social diversity and the 
capacity to respond to it have increased.  Immigration has produced 
greater cultural diversity.  Social and cultural movements demand more 
recognition and accommodation of cultural and physical diversity in 
employment and social services.  Research in both medicine and the social 
sciences has detected significant variation in populations previously 
treated as homogeneous and has sought to make interventions more 
sensitive to such variation. 
 Increased change and diversity undermine traditional forms of 
public intervention premised on stability and uniformity.  Both public and 
private actors have responded to these demands by creating new forms of 
organization—neither markets nor hierarchies—that compensate for the 
limits of ex ante knowledge by rapid, deliberate learning from parallel and 
collaborative exploration of new risks and possibilities. Simultaneously, 
they seek to accommodate diverse circumstances and characteristics both 
within and across groups. 
 Democratic Experimentalism aims to understand the common 
features in these responses and to show both that they seek a kind of 
accountability we associate with law and that dominant understandings of 
law should be revised to make the most of their potential.  
 
 I. General Themes 
 
 The underpinnings of Democratic Experimentalism lie in 
American pragmatist theory, and in mid-twentieth century innovations in 
organization. 
 A. Pragmatism.   
 The term pragmatism is widely used in contemporary legal 
discourse, but it most often connotes merely an eclectic, if not 
contemptuous, attitude toward theory.  The term as applied to the 
orientation discussed here connotes a coherent and germinal body of 
thought best set out in the work of John Dewey. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2983932 
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 The pragmatist themes that most influenced twentieth century 
American law were instrumentalism and contextualism.  Instrumentalism 
prescribed a forward-looking approach to legal legitimacy emphasizing 
consequences rather than a backward-looking approach emphasizing first 
principles or historical continuity.  Contextualism insisted that legal norms 
be understood in the circumstances in which they were used.  It thus 
rejected formalism in interpretation and rigid bureaucracy in regulation.  
This rejection was long ago absorbed as a standard position in mainstream 
legal thought, though never an uncontested one. 
 Two further points associated with Dewey’s pragmatism, which 
did not become part of the mainstream legal thought, were empiricism and 
sociability.  These premises are central to Democratic Experimentalism. 
 The empiricist point was rooted in Deweyan psychology.  Both 
individually and collectively, people form habits and formulate rules that 
capture their experience and enable them to deal effectively with their 
environment.  The process can become dysfunctional, however, when 
habit congeals into “routine.”  Then, people continue to operate on 
assumptions that respond to past experience without taking account of 
changed or new circumstances.  When routine encounters dissonant 
phenomena, people experience what Dewey called an “irritation.”  Such 
encounters could be inducements to re-examine taken-for-granted norms 
that had congealed into routine.  The pragmatists favored processes 
that would productively exploit such encounters.  Applied to social policy, 
this precept led to an emphasis on provisionality and experiment.  As 
Dewey said, “[P]olicies and proposals for social action [should] be treated 
as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and 
executed.  They will be experimental in the sense that they will be 
entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the 
consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and 
flexible revision in the light of observed consequences.” 
 The closest Dewey had to a large-scale model for political 
organization was science.  He repeatedly suggested that politics should 
emulate key features of the institutions of science – the commitment to 
testing belief against experience, freedom to criticize established views, 
transparency and free access to information, and a sense of collaboration 
among peers.  In science, as Dewey saw it, anyone is free to challenge 
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accepted beliefs.  People respond to such changes, not by attempting to 
resolve them abstractly, but by agreeing on procedures for testing the 
relative merits of competing propositions.  A test typically involves 
controlled variation to compare the effects of different interventions on a 
common material or of a common intervention on different materials.  We 
measure the results in terms of agreed criteria.  And then we assess the 
significance of the results for the challenged belief.  The resulting 
conclusion is not established by bureaucratic fiat or majority vote, but by 
an informal consensus among members of a loosely defined community of 
practitioners. 
  The final premise of Dewey’s view was a distinctive conception of 
sociability.  Dewey held that the individual and the group were mutually 
constitutive: neither was intelligible without the other any more than an 
alphabet and its letters have meaning except in relation to each other.  He 
thought that American culture tended to underestimate the personal 
satisfactions of collaboration and the extent to which the development of 
individual capacities and interests depended on social engagement.  His 
was not a family conception of sociability, attributing solidarity to shared 
background and culture, but a lifeboat conception that associates solidarity 
with the possibility and experience of effective collaboration.  In a 
lifeboat, people collaborate because their welfare depends on it.  Diverse 
values and perspectives need not be disabling obstacles; they are often 
beneficial because they give the group access to a wider range of 
knowledge. 
 The empiricist and sociability premises underwrote a distinctive 
argument for democracy.  Democracy, Dewey argued, was the politics 
best suited for effective problem-solving.  Democracy, with its 
commitment to free-speech and official accountability, was least tolerant 
of the kind of ossification of belief that the pragmatists saw as the most 
basic problem of social order.  In addition, by maximizing participation in 
public-decisionmaking, democracy was able to bring to bear a larger range 
of perspectives and information.   
 Dewey favored democratic institutions that emphasized 
provisionality, deliberation, and decentralization.  Norms should be 
provisional so that they can be re-examined in the light of experience.  Re-
examination should take the form of deliberation in which diverse 
perspectives are brought to bear.  Decentralization is important because 
the most productive forms of social engagement occur in “face-to-face 
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relationships by means of direct give-and-take.” 
 B. Post-Bureaucratic Organization 
 Dewey’s prominence has fluctuated over the years, but even during 
the periods of his greatest influence as a philosopher, his distinctive 
political ideas have had surprisingly little currency.  One problem is that 
their institutional implications have seemed elusive, even mysterious.  For 
example: How can norms be open to continuous re-assessment and yet 
provide the stability needed for effective social order?  And how do we 
empower diverse local groups while maintaining the ability to coordinate 
across and beyond a large nation? 
 No doubt many found the institutional implications of Dewey’s 
work confused or Utopian because they contradicted the basic assumption 
widely held throughout much of the twentieth century that there are only 
two key types of organization – markets and bureaucracies.  Markets 
operate through individual contracting and price signals.  Bureaucracies 
operate through centrally promulgated stable and hierarchical rules.   
 This assumption was dominant from the Progressive era through 
the 1970s, and it is still influential in the legal academy.  But elsewhere it 
has been recognized that it excludes at least one important category of 
organization.  This category might be called post-bureaucratic.  It includes 
a range of organizations that were first observed in the industrial sector in 
the mid-twentieth century and have since emerged in many areas of both 
public and private spheres.  Its distinctive features have been most salient 
in “lean production” manufacturing firms, which must adapt to short 
product cycles and demand for specialized features, and “high reliability” 
organizations such as aviation or nuclear power, where breakdown 
threatens catastrophe.  Especially influential examples have been the 
Toyota Production System and the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine 
program. A vast literature on the resulting “learning organizations” has 
emerged. 
 Post-bureaucratic organization is constituted by four features.  
None is a defining feature of markets or bureaucracies.  All can be seen as 
responding to uncertainty.   
 First, rolling rule regimes.  In such a regime, rules govern 
comprehensively, but agents are instructed to depart from them when 
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compliance would be inconsistent with the rules’ underlying purposes.  
However, agents must signal their departures in ways that trigger review 
of their actions, and when the departures are sustained, the rules get re-
written to reflect the new understanding gained from the review.  By 
contrast, conventional bureaucracies do not authorize rule departures by 
subordinate agents, and when departures occur, they tend to respond either 
by sanctioning them or, where consistent enforcement is impractical, 
ignoring them. 
 Second, root cause analysis of unexpected adverse events.  
“Significant operating events” that signal dysfunction, like unexpected 
deaths in a hospital or “near misses” in aviation are analyzed diagnostically 
to determine their systemic causes and practices are revised to prevent 
them in the future.  The triggers of these reviews are neither prices of the 
sort that drive markets nor rule departures of the sort that mobilize 
corrective intervention in bureaucracies.  The assumption is that the 
proximate cause of the problem is unlikely to be the root or underlying 
cause, and that the underlying cause—unknowable ex ante—could be 
associated with a flaw in the design of the overall system. Root-cause 
analysis is thus directed, not at detecting breakdowns in systems that 
function well when operating as planned, but rather at uncovering the 
limits of plans. 
 Third, peer review.  Proactive audit processes trigger examination 
of specific instances of frontline processes through collegial dialogue.  
Typically, the agent explains what she did, and the reviewers respond to 
the explanation and conclude with some evaluation of the actions.  In 
traditional bureaucracy. superiors are presumed to have more 
encompassing and reliable knowledge of circumstances and adequate 
responses to them than subordinates, and are therefore best placed to make 
rules and review their application. In post-bureaucracy, lower level agents 
are presumed to have access to information about problems and solutions 
unavailable elsewhere, and therefore to have an important formal role in 
revising rules (not just devising local work-arounds) even if this 
undermines hierarchy.  
 Fourth, performance measurement.  The regimes specify indicators 
that measure aggregate performance.  The measurements track both the 
extent of compliance with the regime’s norms and the extent to which the 
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underlying goals are being achieved.  (While the use of indicators has long 
been conventional in organizations, they do not appear at all in canonical 
accounts of the classic model of bureaucracy, where rules do all the work.  
In practice, they appear to be more central in post-bureaucratic 
organization.)  The measures are used to guide discussion about how 
practice can be improved.  Discussion begins by considering the efficacy 
of the organization’s practices in furthering its goals, but it may reach 
reconsideration of whether prior understanding of goals needs revision in 
the light of experience.  In addition, measures may have to be reconsidered 
and revised because they failed to capture the factors originally intended, 
or because of unanticipated collateral factors, or because people have 
adapted to them manipulatively and counter-productively (for example, 
“teaching to the test”).   
 Each of these four practices is designed to institutionalize the kind 
of confrontation between the inherited stock of operating rules and the 
“irritations” of dissonant experience that Dewey saw as central to social 
life.  Each attenuates the distinction between enactment and 
implementation.  Each diffuses the practice of deliberative re-assessment 
throughout the organization as a continuous practice.  In conventional 
bureaucracies, such deliberation occurs only at the top and episodically. In 
markets, it has no place at all.   
 The four practices are part of the conventional wisdom of modern 
management reform, and they arrive in many variations, not all of which 
vindicate pragmatist aspirations.  Where the forms are adopted without a 
sincere aspiration to alter practice, they may simply generate unproductive 
paperwork and meetings.  In some variants, they are designed less to foster 
learning from frontline experience and more to tighten and expand 
hierarchical control and induce greater fidelity to rigidly stipulated goals 
and metrics.  In these systems, goals and metrics tend to be promulgated at 
the top without frontline input, and information from monitoring tends to 
be used more punitively to induce greater effort than diagnostically to 
enable greater efficacy.  These systems resonate more with Foucauldian 
critique than with Deweyan prescription; their administrative practices are 
experienced as oppressive regimentation and surveillance more than as 
opportunity for creativity and collaboration.   
 Even at their best, however, these systems may not appeal to all 
participants.  Some who have accommodated themselves to rule-governed 
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bureaucracy may not welcome the call for initiative and creativity.  They 
may prefer predictable routine or the opportunities to pursue their 
idiosyncratic projects within the interstices of formal rules.  Moreover, 
many nominally bureaucratic organizations in fact accord a good deal of 
minimally supervised discretion to frontline workers, such as teachers or 
police officers.  For these workers, reform will increase demands that they 
become more articulate about their practices.  Some will resent the loss of 
informality, spontaneity, and privacy.   
 No doubt many workers performed well under these informal 
regimes, and many systems performed well as a whole.  But even at their 
best, these systems have limitations that have become increasingly 
important.  First, it is more difficult to learn and transmit learning in 
informal systems.  Where knowledge remains tacit, new recruits have to 
be inducted through acculturation, which may be relatively expensive.  
Moreover, tacit premises are harder to test, and efficacy cannot be 
rigorously assessed across sites unless they are fully articulated.  Finally, it 
is more difficult to achieve accountability without explicit practices and 
measures of performance.  In the public realm, this is a problem of 
democracy as well as efficiency. 
 C. Experimentalist Architecture 
 The organizational model that vindicates pragmatist aspirations 
combines the four elements of post-bureaucratic organization with a more 
general architecture.  The most basic constituents of this architecture are a 
“center” and a set of “local units”.   In practice, the center is sometimes the 
national government, and the local units, its federated states or 
municipalities.  Or the center could be a government agency, and the local 
units the private actors it regulates or the public and private service 
providers with which it contracts.  Or the center might be a single public 
or private organization with the local units its (territorial) subdivisions: a 
state department of child welfare services and its regional districts, as one 
example, or a school district and its individual schools, as another.  
 These relations are often nested, with an entity such as a school 
district at once the local unit of a broader (state) jurisdiction and the center 
of a territorial unit of its own; but the relation between continguous 
“higher” and “lower” units is the similar, regardless of where they are 
located within the system.  Together, the center and the local units set and 
revise goals, and the means of pursuing them in an iterative process.  
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Governing norms – for example “adequate education” or “good water 
status” – are formulated in general terms, and provisional measures for 
gauging their achievement are specified, whether by legislation, 
administrative action, or court order, through consultation among the 
center and local units and relevant outside stakeholders.  Local units are 
explicitly given broad discretion to pursue these ends as they see fit.  But 
as a condition of this autonomy, the local units must report regularly on 
their performance and submit to monitoring in which their results are 
compared to other units employing alternative means to the same end.  
The local units must explain their efforts to peers and superiors; show that 
they have considered alternatives, and demonstrate that they are making 
progress or are making plausible adjustments if not.  The center provides 
services and inducements that facilitate this disciplined comparison of 
local performances and mutual learning among local units.  Finally, the 
framework goals, performance measures, and decision-making procedures 
themselves are periodically revised on the basis of alternatives reported 
and evaluated.  And the cycle continues. 
 Neither “botton up” nor “decentralization” is an accurate term for 
this architecture.  It is not like a market (the conventional paradigm of 
decentralized organization) because it has a center.  But the center does 
not correspond to the conventional notion of hierarchy because it is 
facilitative and supportive, not directive. The key ambition is to combine, 
in a manner responsive to Dewey’s aspirations, local initiative with 
accountability. 
 
 II. Relation to Other Currents in Contemporary Legal Thought 
 
 Pragmatists are skeptical of the claims of other theories to 
fundamental or comprehensive status, but they consider that many of them 
may have useful tools for particular types of problems.  So Democratic 
Experimentalism does not so much dismiss the dominant theoretical 
orientations as question their usefulness for many important questions, 
especially those in the growing domain characterized by uncertainty.   
 Legal academics have tended to focus their theories on the position 
of the judge confronting a hard case, one in which there are reasonable 
arguments on both sides of a contested legal issue.  The pre-eminent 
responses have emphasized either interpretation or policy engineering.  
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Interpretivists offer techniques by which the ambiguities of pertinent 
authority can be resolved analytically.  Policy engineers suggest that the 
judge use her discretion to impose the most efficient resolution and offer 
techniques, mostly derived from economics, for determining what it is. 
 Democratic Experimentalists, while conceding the power of these 
approaches in some contexts, emphasize that they are not adequate for 
many of the hard cases that pre-occupy the legal culture.  Part of the 
problem is the indeterminacy of governing authority.  In hard cases, legal 
authority often cannot be made, through analytical means, to yield 
determinate answers. Rapid change in circumstances, and its correlate, 
increased heterogeneity, exacerbate this indeterminacy.  Efficiency norms 
are also sometimes too ambiguous to yield specific resolutions.  They are 
most applicable in static comparisons, as in evaluating the allocative 
effects of a change in a single rule, all else equal. Determining the 
efficient solution when institutions and technologies are changing rapidly, 
and when the decision itself could affect those changes, is incomparably 
more difficult. In these situations, judges will lack the information 
necessary to calculate reliably the effects of alternative rulings. 
 Both the interpretive and policy engineering perspectives are based 
on Principal-Agent premises.  The principal is presumed to have a 
conception of a policy or plan detailed enough to induce agents — by 
contract in a market; by promotion or penalty in a hierarchy —to 
undertake particular tasks and to judge performance reliably enough to 
reward success and punish failure.  The judge is the agent; the legislature 
or the broader polity is the principal.  By contrast, experimentalists 
suggest that many hard cases are hard precisely because the relevant 
principal (however we conceive it) does not know what it intends or 
desires.  This is because intent or desire depends on facts and 
circumstances that are not yet known. Thus, intervention must be designed 
in part as a form of investigation, and it must be reconsidered in the light 
of experience. 
 In such situations, experimentalists suggest, the solution to a hard 
case is less likely to be substantive than procedural or institutional.  The 
legal decision-maker adopts the normative output of various stakeholder 
processes, or alternatively induces their formation or their reform.  The 
key criteria of legitimacy are openness to affected citizens and responsible 
operation of the core features of post-bureaucratic organization. 
 Perhaps the most important antecedent of Democratic 
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Experimentalism is the Legal Process school founded by Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks.  A key theme of their perspective was that courts should 
often resolve disputes by deferring to other institutions – agencies, trade 
associations, standard-setting organizations.  Deference was partly a 
function of expertise, partly of procedural integrity.  The court was 
expected to condition deference on the procedural openness and 
responsibility of the institution.   
 In urging this deference, the Legal Process school assumed 
implicitly, however, that the chief problem confronting courts and 
administration was official ignorance of facts known to private actors.  In 
economic regulation, for example, it assumed that both problems and 
potential solutions were well understood by firms, even if conflicts-of-
interest and collective action problems inhibited implementation.  Thus, 
their remedy was public-private coordination between agencies and 
organizations like trade associations and unions.  Courts could assess the 
adequacy of an agency’s efforts to acquire information and engage private 
actors, but where those efforts seemed adequate, they should refrain from 
deciding substantive matters independently.  This procedural approach 
reflected the institutional premises of the New Deal: a trusting view of 
expertise and of regulatory agencies and a very limited sense of 
democratic participation beyond elections or membership in quasi-
corporatist institutions like industrial associations and labor unions. They 
were thus vulnerable to the critique of expertise and agency capture that 
emerged from both the Left and Right in the 1960s and after; they were 
equally unprepared for the rise of the civil rights, feminist, and other social 
movements reflecting emergent interests with no place in the corporatist 
scheme of the 1930s.  
 Democratic Experimentalism has a broader conception of 
knowledge and politics.  It focuses less on the problem of official 
ignorance and more on the problem of uncertainty that limits the capacity 
of both public and private actors to define problems and solutions in 
advance of intervention.  Uncertainty at once limits the value of expertise 
and revalues diffuse, situational knowledge.  It thus gives new force to 
Dewey’s argument that ordinary citizens have information experts lack 
and that relatively direct participation by affected people in public 
problem-solving is a constitutive aspect of democracy.   “Only the man 
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who wears the shoe knows where it pinches,” he wrote.    
 Democratic Experimentalism has some overlap with legal theories 
that have responded to the civil rights revolution by reinterpreting 
American public law in democratic terms.  One important development in 
this line is Bruce Ackerman's recent proposal to anchor constitutional 
adjudication in the norm-generating capacity of spheres of social life, such 
as schools or the workplace. Another is the "democratic constitutionalism" 
of Robert Post and Reva Siegel, which emphasizes the interaction of the 
courts with the other branches and especially with social movements.  
 But while Ackerman takes constitutional values to be inherent 
in the activity of various social spheres, experimentalism assumes that 
these values arise in mutually transformative dialogue between 
individuals and institutions in their immediate contexts and courts 
articulating the framing values of the society as a whole. While 
democratic constitutionalism is preoccupied with contestation over 
and construction of broad constitutional principle in its most inchoate 
stages--when the identity of the actors and their institutional 
configuration is most open--Democratic Experimentalism is focused 
on the way broad norms are given meaning in more local 
deliberations once identities and structures are becoming manifest. 
 Finally, there is some affinity between Democratic 
Experimentalism and the academic movement to study and promote 
“Alternative Dispute Resolution”.  In contrast to most legal academic 
endeavor, this work is focused on deliberation rather than analysis or 
argument.  And in principle at least, it is interested in problem-solving, 
which it occasionally understands in institutional as well as psychological 
terms.  However, in much of this work, the core values are harmony and 
stability.  Deliberation is an ad hoc response to disruption, and its key 
purpose is to re-establish equilibrium.  Dewey's emphasis on the dangers 
that consensus will ossify and on the need for institutionalized diversity as 
a spur to re-assessment and discovery are absent.    
 
 III. Experimentalist Observations 
 
 In one sense, Dewey was ahead of his time.  He had trouble 
elaborating the specific practical implications of his ideas because when 
he wrote there were few functioning organizations that embodied the more 
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original features of his prescriptions.  But such organizations have 
emerged in recent decades in response to basic social changes in 
communication, transportation, and information technology.   Recent 
scholarship has sought to interpret these developments in the light of 
Deweyan experimentalism.  Repeatedly, it turns out that legal regimes 
conventionally thought of as consisting of general substantive rules 
involve generalist law makers inducing or policing “contextualizing 
regimes” in which stakeholders, facing increasing uncertainty, engage and 
revise norms continuously. 
 A.  Private Law 
 In the classical view that is still the starting point of the law 
curriculum, contract is the paradigmatic form of private law, and contract 
defines a process by which individuals (or organizations who can be 
treated for this purpose as individuals) make binding exchanges.  The 
picture emphasizes judges and legislatures making general substantive 
rules and actors transacting within them.  
 Within this view, interpretivist views compete with policy-
engineering ones, and formalist interpretivist views compete with 
contextualist interpretivist views.  But a longstanding and recently re-
invigorated strand of contracts scholarship has suggested that these 
debates are irrelevant or peripheral to the practical stakes in most disputes.  
It argues descriptively and normatively for a more procedural approach.   
 One category of contract that escapes the classical contexts was 
explored by Hart and Sacks and allied scholars.  These are contracts 
between businesses based on standard terms and often enforced through 
specialized arbitration procedures.  The standard terms are not negotiated 
in individual contracts.  They are incorporated wholesale by reference or 
in the form of boilerplate, or they may be drawn on by enforcers to resolve 
ambiguities in language.  Trade associations often coordinate stakeholder 
participation to administer and revise the terms and processes.  When trade 
associations act by themselves in these capacities, the arrangements are 
referred to as private legal systems. But often, as in the cases that drew the 
attention of Hart and Sacks, problems such as externalities or imbalances 
of power call for public bodies to participate in defining terms, 
enforcement, or dispute resolution, or all three. 
 A different and important category involves situations where 
uncertainty is high and there are few potential parties to any particular 
agreement. In these arrangements, the goal is not to regulate the exchange 
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of a determinate class of goods or services, but to establish a collaborative 
regime for the development of some new product or technique that neither 
party can specify ex ante.  Here principal-agent relations break down in 
their paradigmatic setting.  Neither party can form the idea of a project and 
its feasibility without the help of the other, and innovation becomes 
explicitly social in the way Dewey imagined.  As research-and-
development activities are disaggregated across firms, we see more 
“contracts for innovation”. Instead of defining incentives to perform 
particular tasks, such contracts establish processes of consultation and 
information exchange — regular meetings with information-forcing 
decision rules — that allow each party to determine the probity and 
capacity of the other, and both to determine the feasibility of a project 
while protecting themselves against the vulnerabilities that collaboration 
creates. Once collaboration begins to work, high switching costs —the 
expense of finding a partner as trustworthy and capable of learning as the 
current one — provide the assurance necessary for both parties to make 
project-specific investments even in the absence of formal agreement.  
Such contracts are designed to be self-enforcing in most situations.  They 
give each party numerous opportunities to detect opportunism or 
incapacity in the other and the rights at various stages to terminate the 
relation when it is not satisfied.  Thus, the contracts do not often reach the 
courts. When they do and a court finds fault, the appropriate remedy will 
usually be reliance damages (compensating the plaintiff for expenses 
incurred in the fruitless collaboration) rather than expectation damages 
(reproducing the state in which the contract would have been executed) 
because these contracts presuppose that the parties cannot know what to 
expect from their collaboration.  
 A third category includes standardized mass contracts for the 
purchase of consumer goods.  Neither the private law system nor the legal 
process solutions are applicable since consumers have no opportunities to 
bargain and are not effectively represented in industry associations.  But it 
seems unlikely that courts have the specialized knowledge or the capacity 
for rapid adaptation needed to police evolving seller practices (although 
advocates of contextualizing interpretivism in contract have long 
maintained, on scant evidence, that they do).  Public regulation of fair and 
unfair contract terms is required; but such regulation has to be able to 
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respond to the highly innovative — and often devious — efforts by sellers 
to game existing rules. Promising administrative regimes are being 
constructed in the European Union and in the US (by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency), and we take up their general features below. 
 B.  Public Law: Regulation and Social Welfare  
 The conception of the administrative state dominant in legal 
thought for most of the 20
th
 century saw administration as a balance of 
bureaucracy and discretion.  Bureaucracy meant hierarchically 
promulgated rules.  Discretion was grounded in expert knowledge at the 
top or street-level intuition at the frontline, but in either case it was never 
fully articulable and often presumed ineffable.  Administration was 
checked for individual entitlements by adjudicatory processes.  But 
administrative adjudication of individual claims was considered a separate 
and self-contained process insulated from line administration. 
 Both the rule of law and democratic control were identified with 
bureaucracy.  A major pre-occupation of administrative law was the 
promulgation of rules and assessment of their compatibility with statutes.  
But most people recognized that because rules were inflexible and could 
not address small contingencies and unforeseeable circumstances, some 
residuum of discretion was needed.  On both the right and the left, 
unhappiness with administrative practice tended to produce demands for 
more and tighter rules and less discretion.  At times, there was a tendency 
to treat discretion as unreviewable by outsiders, including courts.  An 
alternative approach subjected discretion to “reasaonableness review,” 
which was usually portrayed as minimal and relatively formless duty to 
provide an intelligible explanation. 
 From about the 1970s, the nature of the social problems and the 
public interventions that produced this conception of administration 
changed. The paradigmatic New Deal regulatory programs were sectoral 
entry-and-price regimes, such as those in communications, transportation, 
and energy.  In conjunction with macro-economic regulation, they were 
designed to produce relative stability and calculability.  The paradigmatic 
social welfare initiatives were social insurance programs – Social Security 
and Unemployment Insurance.  These were explicitly based on actuarial 
premises.  Uncertainty undermined the calculability of outcomes on which 
both the regulation and welfare programs depended, and social change 
produced new problems for which the New Deal models were ill-adapted. 
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 Entry-and-price sectoral regulation came undone for three reasons. 
The first was capture of the regulatory authorities by private interests: 
Incumbent firms often used regulatory decisions to protect themselves 
against challengers. Second, new developments blurred the boundaries 
among sectors, so that the defense of stability increasingly seemed to 
obstruct innovation. Third, new economy-wide regulatory challenges had 
become prominent, such as health-and-safety and environmental and 
consumer protection, that cut across industrial sectors and thus demanded 
different institutional configurations.  
Social policy also became pre-occupied with problems for which 
its New Deal antecedents had not prepared it.  Education is a leading 
example.  The shift towards a high-skill economy, and the corresponding 
loss of stable, well paid unskilled and semi-skilled work, made attainment 
of levels of literacy and numeracy far above historical norms a 
precondition for successful participation in labor markets. Schools must 
therefore be re-organized to meet the needs of the large, but diverse 
groups of students whose family background has not prepared them to 
come to class ready to learn on their own. As learning problems are often 
associated with psychological problems or family stress, moreover, the 
burden of providing new forms of pedagogy is increased by the need for 
coordination with providers other social services as well.  At the same 
time, government has assumed increasing responsibility for health care.  
While some health care provision has long been organized on the model of 
insurance, that model has been strained, for example, by the problems 
associated with adverse selection, by defective incentives for motivating 
preventive care (because private insurers worry that turnover will prevent 
them from capturing long term gains), and by insurer opportunism 
(finding excuses to deny coverage when insureds become seriously ill).   
 One response to these circumstances has been to give up on 
complex organization and to attempt to achieve administrative ends 
through simulation of markets.  By pricing rights or duties and making 
them tradeable, such regimes hope to assign them to the most efficient 
producers and spur technological innovation.  The best-known examples 
are tradeable emissions permits and school vouchers.  Although market 
simulation approaches have been much discussed in the legal academy, 
their practical effects have been minor.  This disappointment is partly due 
to political opposition from emitters of greenhouse gases and teachers’ 
unions.  But it may also be due to limitations of the basic conception.  
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Markets are attractive because they promise to limit information demands 
on all participants.  But the design of simulated markets can create 
extraordinary information burdens, for example, with respect to the setting 
of prices or quantities.  Moreover, simulated markets require elaborate 
regulatory efforts to constrain undesired consequences of the very self-
regarding behavior the markets are meant to encourage.  Ingenious efforts 
must be made, for example, to restrain the tendency of pollution emitters 
to cluster in “hot spots” under a tradeable permit regime or schools to 
attract and select students who need the least help under a voucher regime.   
 The alternative tendency, which has been for more salient in 
practice, is the move toward experimentalist architecture.  Whether 
through legislative design or administrative initiative, programs have 
sought to structure a relation between a center and local units that 
combines decentralized initiative with learning and accountability. 
 In the regulatory sphere, a key development is meta-regulation. 
Rather than presuming to write uniform rules based on the expertise 
available to it, the meta-regulator aims to induce heterogeneous ground-
level actors—firms— to actively investigate the particular risks they face 
and how best to mitigate them. Elements is this approach were pioneered 
in the nuclear power safety program administered by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators and 
by the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP) food safety 
regime developed initially in the US in the private sector.  A 
comprehensive system of meta-regulation has been recently mandated by 
the Food Safety Modernization Act.  Each firm must make its own plan to 
achieve regulatory goals within uniform parameters, and must measure its 
own performance under its plan in terms of stipulated metrics.  The firms 
must report unexpected adverse events, such as “near misses”, and respond 
to such reports by considering ways to mitigate the dangers they reveal.  
The regulator verifies the adequacy of the initial plan, including the 
monitoring regime, and reviews responses to reports of adverse events. 
 As more successful plans are identified, some of their features may 
be codified as mandatory.  Typically, however, actors have substantial 
discretion to substitute alternative measures to the extent they can 
demonstrate that they are equally effective.  The regulator enforces basic 
substantive parameters, but a major part of its activity involves 
management of the experimentalist process that include root cause 
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analysis of significant operating events, peer review, and continuous 
assessment of performance metrics. 
 Similar developments can be observed in social services.  Health 
care has long been ambitiously experimentalist.  Rigorous empiricism in 
the form of the randomized control trials have been central here, and the 
key features of experimentalist organization – rolling rules, root-cause 
analysis, peer review, and performance measurement – have been 
developed with great sophistication.  As government has assumed 
increasing responsibility for health care costs, these features have been 
adopted into the relevant public law.   
 The same trends can be found, albeit at less elaborated stages, in 
child protective services, disability, and poverty relief.  Regimes in these 
fields were typically preoccupied with balancing bureaucracy (rules) and 
frontline professionalism (low-visibility discretion).  Initiatives of recent 
decades impose experimentalist disciplines. 
 Education illustrates this evolution.  Among several developments 
that have challenged traditional administration in education, we can 
mention two.  First, there is the growing awareness of the poor 
performance of U.S. schooling in international comparisons, the class- and 
race-based variation in attainment within the US, and the recurrent finding 
that educational success correlates only weakly with financial resources.  
Second, there is the growing sense that, for many struggling students, 
effective teaching requires tailored interventions that take account of 
individual needs.   
 The first set of developments has led to a move toward “evidence-
based” practice in which educators both within and across schools 
continuously assess interventions both informally at the school and 
classroom level and more formally across schools.  The second set has led 
toward more emphasis on individual diagnosis and tailoring.  The initial 
step here was the adoption of “special education” programs for students 
with medically diagnosed “learning disabilities”.  But at the margin it 
proved hard both in principle and in practice to distinguish students 
lagging because of disabilities from those lagging for other reasons.   
 In consequence of these developments, there has been a 
transformation in the architecture of schooling.  The most salient 
manifestation of these developments are the No Child Left Behind Act of 
  19 
2002 and the Obama administration’s modification of the statutory scheme 
with its waiver and Race to the Top grant programs.  The most discussed 
feature of this regime is its initially very crude accountability measures, 
mandating high-stakes performance assessment with severe penalties for 
schools that do not hit aggregate testing targets.  But this feature, which 
has been much refined since the statute’s enactment, is related to two 
others.  First, the emphasis on performance assessment is in practice 
related to a general tendency to give more autonomy to local school 
systems and individual schools.  Schools have been released from a range 
of rigid rules that dictated resource-use and instructional practice.  The 
emphasis on performance measures is an effort to achieve accountability 
without rigidifying practice.  Moreover, the initial emphasis on high-
stakes rewards and sanctions has given way to a more diagnostic and 
remedial approach.  Tests and other forms of review are designed to 
uncover specific deficits at student and school level and to indicate 
specific remedial interventions.  Race to the Top emphasizes “instructional 
improvement systems” that scan practice at other schools for interventions 
that have proven successful for specific problems.   
 Second, there is a tendency toward greater individuation of 
instruction.  The type of tailored assessment associated with “special 
needs” students has been gradually generalized.  No Child Left Behind 
specifically declares that “all children” have a right to an education that 
enables them to attain at least basic proficiency, and it requires that all 
failing schools provide their students with supplemental resources.  These 
efforts require interventions that are more tailored and provisional than 
bureaucratic administration provides.  At the same time, they differ from 
traditional professionalism in demanding explicit and articulate planning 
and assessment, rather than deference to ineffable expertise. 
 C. Civil Rights  
 The Civil Rights revolution of the Warren and Burger Court eras 
was centrally pre-occupied with explicitly invidious or egregiously 
reckless official behavior.  De jure racial segregation is the paradigm 
example of the first; police use of deadly force against non-violent people 
suspected of minor crimes is a salient example of the second.  Courts were 
able to derive plausible substantive rules to control such behavior. 
 But the success of the revolution changed the issues.  Explictly 
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invidious discrimination virtually disappeared from public life.  
Discrimination became inarticulate and even unconscious.  Moreover, 
much official behavior that was not egregiously reckless nevertheless 
burdened civil rights values in ways widely perceived as unfair.  Thus, 
“second generation” civil rights cases tended to challenge behavior that 
was not openly intended to harm civil rights values and that had some 
legitimate purposes.   
 In effect, second generation claims seek to move the standard from 
intent to negligence and to frame the issue in terms of a duty to reasonably 
consider and weigh civil rights values against others.  Doctrine sometimes 
resists such a duty and clings to intent-focused norms.  The result is either 
the dismissal of all second-generation claims or a willingness to infer 
intent from the “disparate impact” of an official action on a protected 
group or value.  Since intent is highly elusive both conceptually and 
factually, outcomes under the latter approach often turn on assignment of 
the burden of proof.  If the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the 
inference, the plaintiff has a good chance of winning; otherwise not. 
 Another approach to second-generation problems comes closer to 
recognizing a duty of reasonable consideration.  This can be seen in 
Americans with Disabilities Act duty of “reasonable accommodation”.  It 
is also implicit in the stronger forms of “disparate impact” doctrine that 
hold that an inference of discrimination is not rebutted where the 
defendant has failed to adopt an alternative practice that serves its 
legitimate purposes but is less burdensome to civil rights values. 
 Once we get to this point, however, we encounter the familiar 
problem of elusive and asymmetric knowledge.  Defendants have much 
more information about the legitimate costs and benefits of controversial 
practices than plaintiffs and judges, and traditional litigation is a very 
expensive and cumbersome way to induce them to disgorge it. 
 There is thus good reason to frame second-generation civil rights 
enforcement in terms of an obligation to engage in experimentalist 
collaboration in specifying and solving problems.  In fact, we do see 
promising examples of such framing.  The provisions of the Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act on discrimination in pretrial 
detention and the Prison Rape Elimination Act adopt experimentalist 
architecture.  Each declares general goals and then mandates that agencies, 
within uniform parameters, develop plans to advance the goals within their 
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facilities.  The plans must be periodically assessed.  Performance measures 
are used to identify superior performers and to target laggards for remedial 
intervention.  Adverse incidents must be subjected to root cause analysis.  
Central institutions collect information on effective practice and make it 
generally available. 
 The core norm in this model is a (partly implicit) duty of 
reasonable consideration that is elaborated through a series of 
contextualizing regimes.  Courts and other generalist enforcers would 
enforce procedural requirements for planning, monitoring, and re-
assessment.  They would also enforce basic substantive requirements 
where there was adequate information and understanding to declare such 
requirements.  The operation of the regimes would themselves generate 
information and understanding that might make it possible to recognize 
new practice as mandatory.  In effect, the courts would set substantive 
requirements on the basis of observed performance among the regulated 
units. 
 D. International Law 
 International law was traditionally identified with treaties and with 
customary principles.  However, as with domestic private law, 
international regimes have increasingly confronted problems that are not 
adequately addressed either by negotiated rules or ineffable principle.  
They call for organizations capable of adaptation. 
 The encompassing, post-war international organizations do not 
seem viable for these new tasks.  The United Nations and its specialized 
agencies together with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now transformed into 
the World Trade Organization) integrated large numbers of countries into 
regimes governing broad ranges of issues.  Such regimes depended 
crucially on the global dominance of the United States, which could 
pressure other countries to cooperate.  With the emergence of a series of 
countries able to resist US pressure, regimes must now accommodate a 
greater degree of diversity of preferences.  Thus, the newer regimes tend 
to be more specialized in scope and less encompassing in membership 
than those of the earlier epoch. In many domains there are two or more 
regimes--"regime complexes"-- with partially overlapping, partially 
competing aims, and their capacities for regimentation are 
correspondingly limited. 
 All these trends favor experimentalist architecture.  Thus, we see 
the emergence of specialized international regimes that address specific 
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problems in ways designed to accommodate volatility and diversity.  A 
notably successful example is the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting 
Substances.  Established by international agreement in 1989, the regime 
consists of a cluster of central administrative bodies that coordinate 
national efforts to reduce harm to the atmospheric ozone layer.  The 
regime sets schedules for reducing, and ultimately banning, the use of 
ozone-depleting substances subject to exceptions where technical 
committees find no substitutes are available. Member states report to the 
center on practices and outcomes and submit to monitoring by the center.  
The center administers a fund to subsidize the costs of transition for 
developing countries.  It also supports and publicizes research on new 
technologies and provides technical assistance.  The regime has achieved 
remarkable results and large changes in behavior.  The main mechanisms 
appear to have been collaborative learning induced or at least buttressed 
against the risks of defection by the threat of trade sanctions as the penalty 
for violations, particularly the failure to report accurately on performance.   
 The European Union (EU) is another, perhaps more striking, 
instance of Democratic Experimentalism beyond the state. The EU is not a 
nation-state, since it joins independently self-governed polities, nor is it an 
international organization, since it intrudes in unprecedented degree into 
its members’ domestic affairs.  It does, however, fit the specifications of 
experimentalist polyarchy, linking heterogeneous but interdependent units 
in an epoch of increasing uncertainty.  And in fact key features of this 
architecture have been observed in regulation of networked industries, 
notably communications and energy, as well as in the regulation of health 
and safety, the environment, pharmaceuticals, food safety, and commercial 
aviation.  The model has been more recently extended tentatively in other 
areas, including financial services and human rights. 
 These areas are governed by “framework directives” that specify 
general goals but contemplate variation in implementation among member 
states.  Rules take a rolling or presumptive form.  “Comply or explain” is 
the norm.  A state must follow the rule or explain why its departure as 
served the underlying purposes as well or better.  Many regimes have 
significant event reporting systems that demand diagnostic follow-up.  
Peer reviews processes in which member state performance in a given area 
is assessed and critiqued by teams of experts from other member states, 
are common.  Demanding reporting requirements and performance 
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indicators are also frequent.   
 
 IV. Recurring Issues 
 
 A. Domain  
 Dewey spoke of Democratic Experimentalism as a general model 
of political organization.  Contemporary experimentalists often take this 
tone as well, but they also speak of experimentalism as a response to 
specific social conditions of fluidity and diversity.  The experimentalist 
literature suggests that current social and economic change favors the 
expansion of experimentalism.  But assuming this is so, the question 
remains whether the traditional legal regimes that emphasize general and 
stable rules enforced substantively by generalist officials will continue to 
play an important role.  A pragmatist has no resources for excluding this 
possibility categorically. For now we observe only that in domain after 
domain the frontier of law is experimentalist.    
 B. Soft v. Hard Law 
 The Democratic Experimentalist architecture emphasizes 
collaboration and deliberation.  To some, this emphasis implies voluntary 
participation and is thus incompatible with coercion.  Thus, 
Experimentalism is said to have an affinity with “soft law” – law that 
operates by carrots rather than sticks, or by sticks that take only the 
intangible form of shaming or reputational harm.   
 As a descriptive matter, it is not correct to conflate 
Experimentalism with “soft law”.  Some regimes have quite conventional 
coercive sanctions and even unconventional sanctions often involve 
tangible harm.  Experimentalism is dominantly procedural.  Sanctions for 
failing to comply with procedural duties can be conventional and harsh.  
Failure to supply required information, falsification of reports, or 
persistent failure to correct norm infractions under these regimes can lead 
to exclusion from valuable markets or criminal sentences, for example.  
The characteristic tangible sanctions in these regimes tend to take the form 
of a “penalty defaults”.  As originally defined in the contracts context, a 
penalty default is a provisional resolution imposed in situations where the 
decision-maker does not know as well as the parties what the best 
resolution is.  It is designed, not to approximate the best resolution, but to 
induce the parties to negotiate a better one.  A favorite example is a rule 
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under the Endangered Species Act that precludes development that would 
impair the habitat of a listed endangered species.  The statute provides an 
exception where the administrator commits to implement an adequate 
“Habitat Conservation Plan” to mitigate harm from the development.  A 
key criterion of adequacy is the approval of the plan by stakeholders.    
Here, the penalty default is a prohibition of development.  This is a 
tangible and harsh mandate.  However, it is designed to induce the 
developer to engage stakeholders and to produce a plan that is likely to be 
better than one that the regulators could devise on their own. 
 C. Distributive Issues 
 People sometimes worry that experimentalism is insensitive to 
distributive issues and that the move to experimentalist regimes will 
exacerbate the situation of disadvantaged stakeholders.  They are, of 
course, clearly right to emphasize that the outcome of a collaborative 
process will be affected by the relative resources of the participants.  Even 
if a group’s consent is required to go forward, that consent may be 
inflected by the group’s disadvantage.  Experimentalist regime design does 
try to take account of these factors in three ways. 
 First, procedural design can try to mitigate inequality.  A neutral 
can be charged with moderating discussions to insure everyone is heard.  
Some or all participants can be given funds to use for assistance in 
researching or articulating their positions. 
 Second, if design can reach background default rules, than it can 
enhance equality by shaping the rule that will govern in the absence of 
stakeholder agreement.  The Endangered Species Act penalty default is a 
good example.  Before the Act, the default rule permitted the developer to 
go ahead without taking account of stakeholder views.  The penalty 
default changes the balance of power in ways that make it more likely 
both that there will be engagement and that any agreement will be fair. 
 Third, certain possible outcomes can be ruled out as substantively 
unacceptable.  An outcome that involves explicit racial or gender 
discrimination or the expropriation of a non-participant’s property, for 
example, can be excluded at the outset. 
 But even after such constraints are adopted, anxiety about equality 
may persist.  The problem is that it will rarely be possible to fully specify 
in advance the effects of inequality and hence to identify the extent to 
which the outcome has been affected by it. 
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